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Introduction
When we talk about innovations and creativity it is seldom in the context of 
unions and work councils. And in everyday life it is also rather the case that 
these economic actors are associated with alternative business methods and 
resistance to change. Divergent interests and views can however favour the 
emergence of new forms of organisation and working methods (Stark, 2009). 
From this perspective, creativity and innovation are seen as growing at points 
where there is overlap or friction between differing interests and associations of 
meaning. For a problem to actually be solved by an innovation requires not only
that the problem be solvable and that there are active actors. Long term 
structures and one-off coincidences and situations also foster an environment in
firms and territories that stimulates innovation. This territorial nexus of 
innovation increases the number of possible influences on operational 
innovation. Among territorial innovation models (TIMs) (Moulaert and Sekia, 
2003), the interaction-based approach to innovation systems enjoys great 
popularity (Cooke, 2004). Here industrial relations, components of which are 
work councils and unions, are regarded as an element of regional innovation 
systems. The industrial relations engender specific framework conditions that 
can encourage innovations in the workplace.
It is not in all countries that employees and their representative bodies can co-
determine firm-operational processes of change to the extent that is possible in 
Germany with its corporatist model of industrial relations (van Gyes, 2003). 
National differences in “varieties of capitalism” (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Bathelt 
and Gertler, 2005) are revealed, for instance, in structural preconditions for the 
participation of various groups of actors in processes of innovation. However, 
the relationship of national and sub-national institutions to one another and to 
firm specific and product specific properties also represents such an interaction 
context (Rafiqui, 2010). A multi-scalar perspective of intertwining rules, 
constellations of actors, forms of coordination and situative factors can create 
concrete results at a concrete time in a concrete place. 
In Germany the shift in collective bargaining from an areal approach to one 
based increasingly in the individual firms is understood as power shifting to 
benefit corporate actors in terms of regulatory competences. In practice, this 
does not mean that these regulatory competences are practised without support
or incentives from the territorial environment. The increasing involvement of 
work councils in firm-operational innovation – a task that does not directly fall 
under the remit of interest representation – extends the search for appropriate 
solutions for emerging problems to the territorial environment. 
The concrete framework conditions for co-determination are understood here as
opportunity structures for the participation of employees and their representative
bodies in processes of innovation. A basic assumption of the argument is that 
the structural preconditions for the German co-determination model provide 
opportunity structures for innovation-related interactions between employers, 
employees and their representative bodies. First, it is asked whether a focus on 
regional characteristics and particularities is sufficient to explain firm-operational
innovation processes, or whether it is not rather the case that national or even 
wider reaching influences can be identified. Innovations are considered that 
were initiated with the active participation of work councils, particularly 
organisational innovations. The second question focuses on structural 
preconditions that make possible and support work council participation or that 
hinder and limit participation. The search for these opportunity structures is 
undertaken from a multi-scalar perspective in both the firms and also in their 
territorial environment. Both questions are explored using five case studies from
the Stuttgart region (the city of Stuttgart and the districts Boeblingen, 
Goeppingen, Esslingen, Ludwigsburg and Rems-Murr). The paper aims to 
uncover those opportunity structures that promote innovation-related interaction
between actors internal and external to the firms. Criticism of the use of a 
regional frame of reference to explain the emergence of innovation (Freeman, 
2002; Bathelt and Depner, 2003; Rutherford, 2004; Heeg, 2008a) is put to the 
test. The level of the individual and the single firm is used as a starting point, so 
that in the firms and their territorial environment empirically tangible categories 
that favour innovation processes in the context of heterogenic actors are 
identified. This then provides a basis from which a policy relevant perspective of
the spatial dimension of operational innovation processes is derived. This is 
carried out using the example of the participation of employees and employee 
representatives in the context of the German co-determination model. 
Nonetheless, categories of analysis can be derived that can be generally 
applied to explain change and stability in organisations. For instance, in the 
German co-determination model there are interactions between firm-based and 
regional actors, both within the firm and the region. An analytical division 
between firm, region and further territorial frames of reference allows the 
categorising of real actors, institutions and processes. Employers, employees 
and work councils are to be found in firms, unions are organised into regional 
administrations with spatial spheres of responsibility, and institutions – in the 
form of legislation – also have a territorial validity. 
Conceptual framework
Constellations of actors in the German model of industrial relations
Industrial relations are a significant element of the corporatism of the 
coordinated market economy that represents the German model of the 
“varieties of capitalism” (Hall and Soskice, 2001). The central actors at the 
micro-scale are the work council and the employer. The sectoral and inter-firm 
meso-scale includes negotiations between unions and employers’ associations. 
The macro-scale encompasses the entire economy and the state and refers to 
tripartite state regulation negotiated between unions, employers’ associations 
and government representatives. The negotiations between the actors of these 
“arenas” can be “integrative (e.g. cooperation between work councils and 
employers when introducing a technological innovation to the production 
process) or dissociative (e.g. strikes and lock-outs)” (translated from Armingeon,
1995: 15).
In the course of increasing global competition the German model of industrial 
relations has since the 1980s undergone drastic changes. For instance, in 
recent years a tendency for collective bargaining to be increasingly based within
the individual firms can be recognised. This involves a comparative decline in 
territorial regulatory competences to the benefit of negotiations in individual 
firms between work councils and management (Bispinck and Schulten, 1999; 
Berndt, 2000; Trinczek, 2006) or between management and alternative 
representational bodies (Artus et al., 2006; Hauser-Dietz et al., 2008). More 
recently, work councils have been increasingly involved in decision-making that 
goes beyond the legal regulations of the Works Constitution Act (Minssen, 
1999; Minssen and Riese, 2007). Müller-Jentsch (2007: 99) summarises these 
changes under the headings of objectification, rationality and 
professionalisation. Through increasing involvement in decision-making 
(including unpopular decisions), work councils are becoming co-managers. This
brings with it dangers of extortion and overload that can cause the work council 
to lack legitimacy in its task of employee representation (Rehder, 2006). For the 
German model French (2001) has drawn up a matrix of relationships between 
employees, management and unions, demonstrating that the effects of 
collective negotiations between unions and management or employers’ 
associations, and also the initial economic situation of the firm may from the 
point of view of the work council be considered as external factors. Employees 
have a direct influence through the election of work councils, elections that are 
nationally regulated by the Works Constitution Act. Fürstenberg (1964) points 
out that the work council “at the point of intersection between three groups of 
stakeholders: the workforce, the management and the union, (…) [occupies] a 
clear borderline position” (Fürstenberg, 1964: 156, quoted in Müller-Jentsch, 
2009: 168).
Innovations and innovation systems 
In concepts relating to innovation systems, innovations are not only viewed as 
technological research processes, but are seen in the social and dynamic 
context of interaction between various actors. They may aim to improve working
conditions (Bienaymé, 1986; Moulaert and Nussbaumer, 2005) and may include
the introduction of new products and services, processes and forms of 
organisation on at least the level of the firm (Kirner et al., 2010). In the context 
of work councils in the German system of industrial relations and innovations it 
is argued that active work councils build up a reputation (Dilger et al., 1999: 10),
channel information between employees and employers (Jirjahn, 1998), and 
can prevent post hoc resistance to the introduction of innovations (Allen and 
Funk, 2008). Current research on the involvement of work councils in innovation
processes takes little account of the territorial context of innovation (Stracke, 
2006; Blume and Gerstlberger, 2007; Stracke and Nerdinger, 2010; WSI-
Mitteilungen, 2010).
The literature distinguishes between sectoral (Malerba, 2005) and localised 
(Lundvall, 1992; Braczyk et al., 1998) innovation systems. The sectoral 
approach to innovation systems takes sector-specific patterns of innovation as 
the starting point of investigations. Localised systems of innovation demonstrate
a greater territorial relationship either to the national or the regional scale. In the
case of national systems of innovation the emphasis is on the national 
framework conditions of innovation promotion in the form of institutions, actors 
and their patterns of interaction, including training systems, technology 
promotion and also industrial relations.
Two different perspectives for examining the context of sub-national innovation 
have developed. Regional innovation systems (RIS), understood as sub-
national units or as “regional contexts of national innovation systems” 
(translated form Bathelt and Depner, 2003), are viewed in direct relation to the 
level of the nation state and the institutions present at that level, but are also 
seen in terms of their changes and consequent implications for the regions. 
Thus Freeman (2002) argues that the emergence of a RIS is first made possible
by existing regulation in the national framework.
An alternative way of reading RIS involves divorcing the regional level from the 
influence of the nation state to a greater extent, particularly in terms of 
governance structures and production patterns (Cooke, 2004). Here the 
conceptual characteristics of national systems of innovation are transferred to a 
regional innovation context. This involves assuming that innovation processes 
at the sub-national level are systemic in nature. Criticism of approaches that 
use the regional frame of reference for explaining innovation processes 
concentrates on the theoretical and conceptual shortcomings of viewing sub-
national spatial units as systems (Bathelt and Depner, 2003) and the increasing 
influence of globalisation on processes of disembedding (Rutherford, 2004; 
Heeg, 2008a).
Institutions and opportunity structures
Opportunity structures are more or less stable institutions and networks that 
from a spatial perspective can (but do not necessarily) benefit purposeful 
interaction in firms, and indeed in organisations generally. People can thus use 
these opportunity structures, but they can also avoid them.
The system of institutions negotiated in the past by political and business actors
within the corporatist framework provides opportunity structures for the 
participation of employees in firm-based processes of change. Institutionalist 
approaches emphasise that interaction between actors can be regulated by 
institutions and that these institutions can in turn be created by interactions 
(Gertler, 2010). Institutions are “(…) programmes of action that are 
characterised by a certain stability and durability, that are robust enough to 
render actions by one group possible to anticipate by another. (…) Actors 
experience them during their social interactions as restrictions and opportunities
(…) Institutions do not fix actions rigidly, but set a corridor of action through 
which goals and strategies as well as the defined interests of actors and the 
power relations between them are determined” (translated form Müller-Jentsch, 
2009: 254). In systems of innovation institutions provide the rules of the game 
for the actors and increase the reliability of expectations concerning interaction 
partners (Edquist, 2005: 188). The risky and unpredictable course of resource-
intensive innovation processes is guided into a regulated corridor of action by 
institutions in the form of patent regulations, trust and also norms of behaviour.
Networks represent further opportunity structures that can align the match 
between firm-based (work council competences and rights) and territorial 
(collective agreements and corresponding union agendas) conditions. This 
presupposes that the available networks and the resources available within 
them are used. Within firms it is possible to demonstrate the existence of 
different groups of interests on either side of the labour law related divide of the 
Works Constitution Act, between employees and employers. A coherent picture 
of the conditions under which innovations evolve can only emerge by focusing 
on the employers, actors involved in employee participation, and also the 
networks of both (Ettlinger, 2003; Grabher and Ibert, 2006; Glückler, 2007). To 
explain changes in the workplace (Ettlinger, 2003), a balance between 
cooperation and competition (Chetty and Agndal, 2008), or tensions between 
personal interests and company interests (Grabher and Ibert, 2006) 
interpersonal networks can be used. Ettlinger (2003) has shown how 
interpersonal networks can span different spheres of life, e.g. through the 
influence of private contacts on business issues, to cause processes of change 
in the workplace. Different rationalities of social, political, economic or cultural 
nature form the basis of people’s actions and can become drivers for change 
(Ettlinger, 2007: 15). A basic assumption is that people “behave and make 
decisions in one context (e.g. the workplace) that cannot be readily explained in
terms of workplace routines or objectives” (Ettlinger, 2003: 152). Imperatives 
that diverge from one another, fed by the various social networks and identities 
of an individual (Grabher and Ibert, 2006), have effects on concrete situations 
that cannot be clearly seen to be connected to social relations.  
The actors in the Stuttgart region
Pending upheavals in the automotive cluster of the Stuttgart region (Caspar et 
al., 2005; Dispan et al., 2009, 2010) will challenge employee representation, 
which has a strong presence here, to contribute to the future viability of 
individual firms and the region with innovative concepts. The industry structure 
of the region is dominated by automotive manufacturers and their suppliers, 
presenting regional economic and political actors with great challenges, for 
instance in terms of the introduction of new drive technologies, organisational 
concepts and business fields (Scheytt, 2010).
The model of Baden-Württemberg with the core region of Stuttgart is seen in 
the literature as a prototype of an interactive and network-based RIS (Cooke, 
2004) – the actors involved in industrial relations, their interactions and 
networks have, however, received little attention. In the context of the RIS of 
Baden-Württemberg, industrial relations – along with R&D activities and the 
education and training system – are named as being an important constituent of
the institutional regulatory structures of the region (Krauss, 2009). Through the 
prevention of wage reduction strategies local firms are compelled to continual 
innovation by the unions.
Since the dramatic economic cuts of the 1990s and the associated job losses in
the key regional sectors of electrical engineering, mechanical engineering and 
automotive there have been changes in work organisation in the region with 
new actors entering the arena (Iwer and Grammel, 1998; Iwer et al., 2002). In 
addition to the foundation of the Regional Assembly and the Stuttgart Region 
Economic Development Corporation , the metal workers union IG Metall and the
IMU Institute Stuttgart (IMU) found new positions among the range of regional 
actors (Iwer et al., 2002). In 1995 the six IG Metall administrative offices in 
greater Stuttgart area joined together, initially on an informal basis, to create an 
active working body. The aim was to strengthen the effectiveness of the IG 
Metall, particularly in terms of tasks related to regional and structural policy, and
to be able to act in the interests of its members at the political level of the 
Regional Assembly. Joint sessions of the local administrative bodies became 
more common, allowing the most important actors from the IG Metall to cross 
the boundaries of their jurisdictions and to get to know one another (Iwer et al., 
2002: 88f). In the middle of 2000 the IG Metall then established a regional office
for the Stuttgart region with responsibility for the actual design of work-oriented 
structural policy. The tasks of the IG Metall Region Stuttgart today include 
sectoral work, structural policy, publications, training and qualifications for work 
councils, the organisation of events, and stakeholder activities in business 
promotion in the Stuttgart region. The IMU is an independent work-oriented 
research and services organisation that, in terms of the RIS approach, can be 
located among business-oriented service providers. The tasks of the IMU are 
research and consulting, with a focus on employees, particularly on extending 
their spheres of action and competences (IMU, 2003: 1), as well the planning, 
organisation and running of training seminars and workshops catering for 
members of work councils and staff committees. An important area of work for 
the IMU is work council consulting. Most recently, a focus on “work-oriented 
innovation projects” has developed, the aim of which is to create employee-
friendly innovation processes by using the experience of the workforce to 
enhance the innovative potential of organisations (Schwarz-Kocher et al., 2009; 
Schwarz-Kocher et al, 2011). Furthermore, the IMU and the IG Metall Region 
Stuttgart cooperate in the planning, organisation and running of networks of 
work councils (IMU, 1998; Salm, 2005).
Possibilities and limits of opportunity structures1
Within industrial relations corridors of action are opened up in which work 
councils as a “countervailing power” (Kotthoff, 1994) in organisations can curb 
managerial reactions to the imperatives of turbulent markets and can find 
possibilities for shaping processes of operational change. In the observations (i)
the initial economic situation, (ii) the Works Constitution Act, (iii) collective 
agreements, and (iv) hierarchies and networks were presented as opportunity 
structures through which work councils can influence innovation processes. 
The initial economic situation
1The data was gathered in one- to two-hour narrative interviews with work councils and 
employers (separately from one another) and through structured observation of IG Metall and 
IMU events. Organisations were chosen that, with active work council involvement, had been 
able to more or less successfully overcome a crisis situation before 2007. The five case study 
firms belong to the automotive supplier and mechanical engineering sectors, have at least 600 
employees on site, and together employ just over 7000 people.
As well as the firm-based actors work councils, employees and employer, the 
Stuttgart region has with the IG Metall and the IMU regional actors that can 
support the work council in employee representation. “[W]hen it was about this 
make-versus-buy project, the IG Metall was very constructive there (...) not so 
much as the source of innovation but rather as the one who in the 
implementation phase in the negotiation phase came in and said, we’re backing
this, and that’s how it also was again with the district management, there where
you [IMU consultant] were also sometimes there” [WC1]. To overcome a 
negative initial economic situation in a firm the work council can bring in 
specialist support in the form of external consultants with a great deal of 
experience gathered in many of the region’s firms. In the context of negotiations
with the employer, firstly, work-oriented interests can be introduced to the 
measures used to cope with the crisis. Secondly, the work council can use its 
intermediary position in the firm to legitimate to employees unpopular processes
of change that, for instance, affect working hours. Being too ready to 
compromise causes the work council to be criticised by employees. At times 
where the economic situation tends to be calmer however, a retreat into a role 
of classical interests representation is seen, which sets time limits to the role of 
the work council and tends to give it a project character. “[T]he classical class 
struggle [was] suspended here and management and work council ran a co-
management (…): let’s really work on this thing, grapple, and not somehow get 
caught up in political games” (...). Nonetheless there were also indications that 
“when the urgency is no longer so great, and suddenly everyday conflicts 
overlay such a topic again, then it will be difficult” [E5_new]. The negative initial 
economic situation can in some cases be traced back to causes related to the 
individual firm. However as the 2008 crisis showed, events outside the national 
frame of reference and outside the sector in question can have negative effects.
In the context of alternative concepts to the turnaround plans of the employer, 
with the help of external consultants work councils can steer innovations in a 
work-oriented direction and through integrating the employees’ ideas can 
prevent job retrenchment or help make it socially responsible. If collective 
agreements are affected by the processes of change, then a political secretary 
from the IG Metall is involved in the negotiations. Limits may be set to 
alternative concepts on the one hand by a deficit of legitimation vis-á-vis the 
employees, and on the other hand by follow-up costs the extent of which is 
difficult to calculate. The follow-up costs are related to an investment decision 
that at the time of negotiation is justified. When there were concrete problems 
with executing or enforcing parts of the innovation process, then the work 
council could access local help. It was not only the union or consultant that 
could be used for the interchange, but also communication with other work 
council representatives at conferences and network meetings in the region.
The Works Constitution Act
The Works Constitution Act forms the countrywide legal basis of work council 
activities. It formally records the rights and obligations of the work council. It 
enables the work council to bring in external consultants in support. This is, 
however, linked to the enforcement capacity of the work council, not only in 
terms of its powers of persuasion but also in terms of the attitude of the 
employer to the work council. In particular the active participation of employee 
representatives in innovation processes is an unusual situation. It is not 
formalised in the Works Constitution Act and it can be contrary to classical 
interest representation, causing a conflict of interests for the work council, “(...) 
because then naturally topics also come up again that are in some cases 
contrary to a classic interests work council. Where they just have to make 
decisions, they have to also demonstrate the consequences, where they then 
maybe have problems really selling that (…) There the work council is assigned
a designing role that though lies more in its, let’s say authorised power, but 
doesn’t lie in the implementation. Because I think that then you’re not doing 
yourself any favours with that” [E5].The Works Constitution Act states that the 
work council has the obligation to work for the good of the employees and also 
the firm – a structural obligation that cannot always be mastered without 
conflict. It is useful for the work council to take up a clear position; this is 
connected to a “constructive spirit of contradiction” [WC2], also in relation to 
processes of innovation – an important precondition for the implementation of 
employee-friendly and employment-oriented strategies, the guidelines for which 
are set by union members in the firm and at IG Metall events. In this way the 
Works Constitution Act, which has validity throughout the country, receives a 
local interpretation for individual firms. Actual execution cannot however be 
causally traced to the individual paragraphs. It is far more the case that the 
enforcement capacity and acceptability of the work council, its specialist 
competence and the relationship between organisational imperatives and 
collectively agreed standards play a further role in innovation processes and the
activation of other firm-external opportunity structures.
Collective Agreements
Collective agreements with a territorial ambit set the framework conditions for 
the form of work council activities. If in the context of innovation processes it 
appears necessary to deviate from collective agreements, then an IG Metall 
representative is brought into the negotiations. “And the IG Metall was always 
at the table with us as the bargaining partner. That is really terribly important, 
what many don’t do is, that they only get the IG Metall involved when things 
aren’t going any further. But for us it was important, that we involve the IG 
Metall at the beginning in the process of emergence of negotiations. We simply 
no longer declared ourselves responsible (…). Working hours are part of 
collective agreements (…). And in fact there it is just also important, that the 
right partner from the IG Metall is present. Also he then takes over responsibility
and not someone or other, a volunteer, that gets pushed aside. Rather that 
there is one of the political secretaries there. One of the authorised 
representatives or political secretaries that also supervises the firm. That is also
a really important topic. That the one there, the one from the IG Metall that is 
there, that he also has insider knowledge of the firm” [WC5]. Departures from 
collective agreements can take place as an exchange deal linked to 
concessions on the part of the employer. The work council receives on the one 
hand external support, on the other hand a need for negotiation arises due to 
the tension between preserving collective agreements and acute organisational 
need.
Hierarchies and Networks
The circumvention of hierarchies and the use of networks enable quick 
communication between employees, employer and work council on the one 
hand, and between work council and the IG Metall and IMU on the other hand. 
The strategic filling of work council seats with people of differing specialist 
backgrounds opens up paths of communication within firms and contributes 
towards technically sound argumentation in negotiation. “[O]ne great advantage
is that we have a relatively healthy mix in the work council. (…) So I then have 
these links, these interfaces, these points of contact to construction just the 
same as to all the planning departments”  [WC1]. Deficits of specialist 
knowledge in economic and legal matters are compensated for by the inputs of 
work-oriented consultants from the region. This involves ensuring finance for 
the consultant, which the employer must cover. Within the firm work council 
representatives can circumvent hierarchies when communicating with the 
employer and can make their viewpoints about certain issues known in informal 
conversations. Or areas of difficulty that have been discovered through talks 
with individual employees can without circumvention be directly communicated 
to the employer, in some cases after editing:  “there are some things that by-
pass the hierarchy, that maybe are just passed on all over the place. And a 
manager should always be attentive to signals and not only hear what she 
wants to. But again to do that you also have to be willing to listen. The work 
council representative can do that because of his function, first because he 
hears a lot, because he’s also at the basis due to daily visits and also can then 
formulate some things, also knows some connections, he can do a good job 
there” [E5_old].
The relationship of the work council to the IG Metall is influenced by trust in the 
specialist competences of the IG Metall representative. When deviations from 
collective agreements threaten, the work council develops a relationship of 
authority based on specialist knowledge with both the IG Metall representative 
and the unionised employees. The work council’s networks within the firm and 
the region are activated according to need and provide personal and cognitive 
resources for the execution of innovation projects. 
Discussion
Change the perspective!
Building on the research questions initially formulated and the theoretical-
conceptual assumptions, it has been necessary to make two changes to the 
perspective taken on innovation systems. Firstly, the German model of industrial
relations offers possibilities to influence operational innovation processes – an 
aspect so far neglected in most work on innovations and organizational change.
Work council co-determination in innovation processes was not originally 
envisaged in the Works Constitution Act. However, rights and obligations 
pertaining to the work council provide an opportunity for the influencing of 
innovations. With support from external consultants and the union, innovation 
processes can thus be expedited and steered in an employee-friendly direction. 
Secondly, due to their embeddedness in social structures work councils are 
subject to multiple rationalities. This can bring with it a conflict of roles caused 
by serving “the well-being of the employee and the firm” (Works Constitution Act
§2 Para. 1). The work council not only has relationships within the firm, but also 
relationships to the union and the IMU which can potentially influence its 
employee representation activities. Experiences made in one context do not 
necessarily correspond to the often one-dimensional goals of another context 
(Ettlinger, 2007: 14). Should the work council need information for operational 
requirements and to overcome this conflict of roles, then this information can be
gathered through networks, some of which extend beyond the context of the 
firm. Due to its intermediate position between employees, employers and union,
the work council finds itself in a field of tension between different rationalities. 
Decisions that are made in the workplace “derive from a kaleidoscope of 
thoughts and emotions that emanate from different places associated with 
different spheres of life and different social networks” (Ettlinger, 2003: 152). 
Accordingly, policy guidelines are formulated by the IG Metall that can be made 
material subject to the enforcement capacity of the work council and the degree 
of organisation in firm-based policy disputes. These guidelines are part of the 
opportunity structure that allows the work council to influence innovation 
processes. 
A number of imperatives can be expressed within the innovation role of the work
council. These may relate to the concrete innovation process (you must 
influence the innovation to make it as employee-friendly as possible!), to the 
organisation (you must promote innovations because they are important for the 
competitiveness of our firm!) and to personal interests (you must promote the 
innovation so that it is employee-friendly, so that the well-being of the firm is 
served and so that you will be re-elected at the next election of the work 
council!). If the work council representative is at the same time a union member,
then “a single action can be moved in many different games at once” (Grabher 
and Ibert, 2006: 266): in the firm and also in the union or the work-oriented 
consultancy. Thus IMU consultancy experiences can lead to the development of
new consultancy concepts or research projects. And union agendas also have 
their origins in the operational problems of firms (Meyer and Fuchs, 2008).
This change of perspective not only has consequences for the German model 
of co-determination, however. The results suggest that in general taking a 
differentiated view on organisational phenomena brings added-value for the 
spatial perspective. If the object of investigation, in our case the opportunity 
structure, is reconstructed using the actors in the firm as a starting point, then 
this leads to the exposure of those categories that were really significant in 
actual interactions. The spatial frame of reference is not stipulated in advance, 
but rather reveals itself in the course of the individual narratives of the case 
studies.
Only through the change of perspective could the intertwining of a number of 
opportunity structures of different scales be discerned. For instance, the 
rationalities underlying the work council’s actions shifted the focus to other 
opportunity structures than would have been the case with an employer. Thus 
the countrywide valid Works Constitution Act summoned up network relations 
within the firm and to the union and consultants from the region.   
Focus on interactions!
It has been possible to illustrate that the object of investigation – the opportunity
structures – indicates whether the focus must be directed towards to a firm-
based, regional or national innovation context. However, it is the sampling units 
– the interaction partners – that stipulate which opportunity structures are at all 
relevant for them. The question of the spatial frame of reference is not to be 
answered in theoretical conceptual terms but empirically (see Bathelt and 
Depner, 2003). The opportunity structures for work councils cannot be localised 
on any one single analytical level. The chances and limits of the influence that 
work councils can bring to bear on innovation processes can be explained by 
the firm-based intertwining of opportunity structures of differing spatial scales of 
reference. The agenda setting of the union occurs in a reciprocal relationship 
between the local, the regional and the national levels (Meyer and Fuchs, 
2008). The starting point for union measures is experience gathered by the 
union while supervising operations in firms in the region. Here not only the local 
and regional contexts play an important role, but also the individuals who can 
relate the operational problems to regional, national and global developments 
and who have the specialist and legal competences and capacities to initiate 
appropriate steps towards dealing with the problems. The focus is not on the 
firm, but rather on the work council. The opportunity structures used by the work
council in relation to innovations are not only located in the firm. They rather 
represent a multiscalar and interdependent intertwining of institutions and 
networks. 
The Works Constitution Act has countrywide validity, but it is executed in the 
firm. The causes for a poor initial economic situation can be traced back to 
mistakes made by the management or to market conditions that are difficult to 
control. Collective agreements have a spatial ambit, but they can be adapted to 
firm requirements. For tackling problems within innovation processes the work 
council can use social relations both internal and external to the firm in 
question.
The search for one territorial frame of reference for processes of change in 
firms, or organisations in general, seems to be a Sisyphean task. A first step 
can, however, be to direct the search towards individuals as the starting points 
for opportunity structures that enable purposeful interaction between those 
individuals. Only in a second step can the frame of reference be named and 
often, but not always, territorially fixed. The validity of a single frame of 
reference proved to be insufficient. When, however, a network partner or an 
institution was uncovered, then further opportunity structures emerged that 
could then be allocated to other territorial frames of reference. Thus if a 
concrete problem is to be investigated in organisations, then the spatial 
perspective has to be set according to the interactions related to the problem-
solving and not the other way round. 
Case studies and their theoretical implications
This paper has traced influences on innovation processes that are both external
and internal to firms. Precisely a perspective of this sort does not imply neglect 
of the institutional environment, which “certain individuals can dip into with 
relative ease” (Amin and Thrift, 1994: 15; authors’ emphasis).
The opportunity structures and the categories of analysis identified through 
them both in and from the Stuttgart region represent but a part of the work 
council’s corridor of action for operational innovation processes. The (i) initial 
economic situation, (ii) the Works Constitution Act, (iii) collective agreements 
and (iv) networks and hierarchies do not delineate only a regional innovation 
environment in the form of institutions and networks. It is much more the case 
that particularities of organisational culture (e.g. the enforcement capacity and 
acceptability of the work council), supportive organisations from the region (e.g. 
the IMU Institute Stuttgart and the administrative offices of the IG Metall), 
national legislation (e.g. the Works Constitution Act and the right to collective 
bargaining) and international competition (e.g. the worldwide competitive 
situation for organisations) represent opportunity structures on different scales. 
They are interdependent. If a corridor of action is embarked upon, then side 
paths open up. If these side paths are ventured upon, then they demonstrate 
their own limits and chances for the active role of the work council in innovation 
processes.  
What does this then mean for the issue of structural preconditions in the 
Stuttgart region and, concomitant to this, for the positioning of the discussed 
actors, institutions and networks in an innovation system?  Against the 
background of the increasing internalisation in firms of regulation competences 
connected to industrial relations and the future challenges that the Stuttgart 
region has yet to face, available potential should in future be used through 
targeted measures by regional actors. However, as both a warning and an 
encouragement, the results of this investigation indicate at the same time that 
there is a need to emphasise that the regional innovation systems approach can
indeed be helpful as an instrument of analysis and as an aid in the formulation 
of strategies for the compilation of structural preconditions of sub-national 
innovation activities. However, the coordination of action on this level alone 
cannot be expected, it rather requires appropriate national and international 
framework conditions. It should also not be forgotten that the events described 
could have occurred in much the same way in other regions. Of decisive 
importance is though, that multi-scalar influences cumulate in the workplace 
and can bring forth changes. In any case, it can be seen that with the actors IG 
Metall and the IMU Institute Stuttgart the Stuttgart region houses support for 
work councils in the form of important actors for enforcing employee interests, 
also in the context of innovation processes. An important challenge in the future 
will be to create opportunity structures that can stabilise the active role of work 
councils in innovation processes. The present project nature of their 
involvement could thus become an organisational routine. At the same time 
sight should not be lost of employee representation, the attempt could rather be 
made to anchor in the routine patterns of interaction that create “win-win 
innovations” (Schwarz-Kocher et al., 2010) for the employer and employee.
The spatial frame of reference for operational innovations has not been 
categorically fixed. A search for influences on the co-determination of 
innovations both internal and external to the firm was made. This assumes that 
firm-operational structures and processes are principally open to territorial 
influences. Correspondingly, the search must thus be for links between a 
concrete problem in the firm and the matching answer from the territorial 
environment. Conclusions about the relevance of the region, national regulation 
or the markets can only be drawn when the starting point is an actual problem 
that in an actual place (here: the firm) leads to interaction between 
heterogeneous actors. Otherwise the danger is that important factors will be 
overlooked and unimportant factors over-emphasised.
The interaction between work council, employer and regional actors was the 
starting point of the investigation. The actors demonstrated which ontological 
categories (market, networks, hierarchies, legislation) are relevant for their 
actions. For them it is irrelevant whether scientists allocate these categories to a
national or regional innovation system. The scientists can, however, make use 
of the opportunity and assign the individual categories to their frames of 
reference, which may also be spatial/territorial. This has policy implications, 
because concrete actors are attributed with positive or negative characteristics 
in relation to operational innovations and organisational change. It can also be 
deduced from this that actors from politics and business can, even when acting 
purposively, stumble across side paths and trapdoors that rob them of their 
direct influence. The enforcement of changes related to the individual firm or 
sector is only possible in certain conditions. These conditions are found here as 
opportunity structures in the analytical categories of (i) initial economic situation 
(ii) the Works Constitution Act, (iii) collective agreements and (iv) networks – the
list is undoubtedly not exhaustive. As networks and institutions these 
opportunity structures are not determining. They can be used for problem-
solving but their use is not mandatory. Their presence in an organisation or a 
territorial frame of reference alone is no guarantee for their general validity and 
unlimited effectiveness or for their use by people. Opportunity structures thus 
imply conscious action by people and are therefore changeable institutions or 
networks. In this way the arguments presented here also reveal a spatial 
perspective on institutions and networks as opportunities for purposeful action.
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